Basically, the bigger the economic significance of a particular executive action is, the clearer Congress' delegation of authority to do it must be. It's hard to imagine anything more economically significant than what Trump is doing, and SCOTUS can say "if you're so sure Congress is ok with you doing this, we're going to vacate your executive order and you can go to Congress and have them pass the same tariff rates." Which Congress won't do of course.

I'm 80% sure that SCOTUS would rule this way, rather than stand by and watch the US and world economy get wrecked by a handful of economic flat-earthers.

It looks like there's no way to bypass first getting a ruling from a district court, to trigger appellate jurisdiction, not even a petition for Extraordinary Writ under SCOTUS Rule 20. See Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. v. Sebelius, 568 U.S. 1401, 1403, 133 S. Ct. 641, 642, 184 L. Ed. 2d 448 (2012); Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 383, 74 S. Ct. 145, 148, 98 L. Ed. 106 (1953).

So I wouldn't expect SCOTUS to save the day next week or anything, but I think they will do it if need be.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5706196&forum_id=2#48820852)

President Trump relied on the International Emergency Economic Powers Act to impose last week’s reciprocal tariffs, some of which are as high as 49%. This expansion of executive authority clearly oversteps the boundaries set by the Supreme Court’s major questions doctrine. Prominent in recent judicial rulings, the doctrine holds that federal agencies—and the executive branch—can’t make decisions of vast economic and political significance without clear congressional authorization.

IEEPA, enacted in 1977, was intended to rein in what Congress considered overuse of the Trading with the Enemies Act. Under IEEPA, the president retained broad authority to regulate international economic transactions during a declared national emergency. The law’s purpose was to address genuine crises—like foreign aggression or economic sabotage—not to serve as a catch-all to implement domestic policy preferences. Mr. Trump’s reciprocal tariffs stretch IEEPA beyond its intended scope, sidestepping Congress’s constitutional authority over trade and taxation. This undermines the separation of powers and sets a dangerous precedent for unchecked executive overreach—precisely the problem the major questions doctrine seeks to remedy.

Since 2022 the Supreme Court has been clear: When an agency (or the executive) claims authority to resolve a “major question”—a policy issue with “vast economic and political significance”—it must point to clear congressional intent. Tariffs—which reshape global trade, potentially cost American consumers billions, and disrupt entire industries—certainly qualify as major questions.

Mr. Trump’s tariffs aren’t regulatory tweaks; they are transformative economic policies with far-reaching consequences. IEEPA’s text offers no clear mandate for such sweeping actions. It authorizes the president to “deal with any unusual and extraordinary threat” to national security, economy or foreign policy, but its focus is on specific transactions—like freezing assets or blocking trade with hostile entities—not rewriting trade policy writ large. Yet Mr. Trump’s tariffs ostensibly address a “threat” that includes allies and adversaries alike. In introducing the tariffs Mr. Trump acknowledged as much, arguing that “in many cases the friend is worse than the foe.”

By employing this statute, Mr. Trump claimed a unilateral power to tax and regulate commerce—powers the Constitution vests in Congress under Article I, Section 8. The Supreme Court has signaled skepticism toward such executive improvisation. In West Virginia v. EPA (2022) the Court struck down the Obama Environmental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan, ruling that the agency couldn’t overhaul the energy sector without explicit congressional approval.

The parallels to Mr. Trump’s tariffs are striking: Both incidents involve an executive entity leveraging vague statutory language to enact policies of “vast economic and political significance.” The calculation used by the Trump administration to determine tariff rates resembles the “complex equations” that guided the emissions standards the EPA had placed on states such as West Virginia.

IEEPA’s broad wording might invite flexibility, but the major questions doctrine demands specificity when the stakes are this high. Historical precedent reinforces this critique. Congress has long guarded its trade authority, delegating it sparingly and for limited periods through statutes like the Trade Act of 1974. The exception to this rule has been in areas involving national security, where expedited actions were thought necessary. Even when granting emergency powers via IEEPA, however, lawmakers intended a narrow scope—think of President Carter freezing Iranian assets during the hostage crisis, not blanket tariffs on friendly nations.

Mr. Trump’s approach flips this dynamic, treating Congress as a bystander while the president wields emergency powers as a first resort. The Supreme Court, in cases such as Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (1952), has historically rebuked such overreach, denying, in that case, President Truman’s seizure of U.S. steel mills absent congressional backing. Mr. Trump’s tariffs, though less dramatic than a seizure, similarly encroach on legislative turf.

Some argue that national security justifies flexibility, and courts have traditionally deferred to the executive in this realm. But the major questions doctrine prevents presidents from using national security grounds to transfer congressional authority completely to the executive branch by focusing on the means chosen to achieve compelling ends. The likely economic fallout of Mr. Trump’s tariffs—higher consumer prices and job losses in tariff-hit sectors—undercuts the notion that they will bolster security. The major questions doctrine doesn’t deny executive power; it demands accountability to democratic processes, which Mr. Trump’s IEEPA gambit evades.

The implications extend beyond Mr. Trump. If IEEPA authorizes these tariffs, future presidents could invoke the act for any policy framed as mitigating an “emergency.”

The Trump administration complains about judicial overreach. Mr. Trump has even called for the impeachment of certain judges. But by pushing the limits of executive authority, Mr. Trump’s tariffs violate constitutional norms and invite judicial pushback. The solution is simple: Congress must reclaim its role as the arbiter of trade policy. Mr. Trump would likely wield his veto pen in response to any congressional action, so it will fall to the Supreme Court to enforce its major questions doctrine. That may be the only way to restore the delicate balance of power that defines American governance.

Mr. Sracic is a professor of politics and international relations at Youngstown State University and an adjunct fellow at the Hudson Institute.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5706196&forum_id=2#48820899)

He can't enjoy watching these stock crashes- he's always placed a lot of his ego on stock performance.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5706196&forum_id=2#48820917)

Some things are more amenable to judicial review than others. A ruling stopping an airplane flying Venezuelans to El Salvador is, logistically speaking, much easier for the executive to ignore than a ruling on tariffs. Tariffs involve government officials going to importing US companies and saying "you owe us X dollars." After SCOTUS rules, those companies will rightly be able to say "I don't owe you shit- SCOTUS struck down that tariff." What's Trump gonna do- enforce the tariff in a court which WILL follow SCOTUS rulings?

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5706196&forum_id=2#48820934)