https://supreme.justia.com/cases/federal/us/603/23-5572/

Opting for a narrower approach, the Court declines to take (c)(2) on its own terms. Instead, it borrows the evidentiary focus of (c)(1) to hold that a defendant violates (c)(2) only by “impair[ing] the availability or integrity for use in an official proceeding of records, documents, objects, or . . . other things used in the proceeding.” Ante, at 16. Other means of obstructing a proceeding—say, by shutting it down—are out.

This interpretation might sound faithful to the statute, because the limit comes from a related provision rather than thin air. But snipping words from one subsection and grafting them onto another violates our normal interpretive principles. “ ‘[W]e ordinarily resist reading words or elements into a statute that do not appear on its face.’ ” Dean v. United States, 556 U.S. 568, 572 (2009) (quoting Bates v. United States, 522 U.S. 23, 29 (1997)). And “ ‘[w]here Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another section of the same Act,’ ” we generally presume that Congress did so intentionally. Russello v. United States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v. Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (CA5 1972) (per curiam)). The Court’s reasons for departing from these rules are thin.

1

The Court begins with the noscitur a sociis and ejusdem generis canons. Ante, at 5. The noscitur canon counsels that “words grouped in a list should be given related meanings.” A. Scalia & B. Garner, Reading Law §31, p. 195 (2012) (internal quotation marks omitted). It is particularly useful when interpreting “ ‘a word [that] is capable of many meanings.’ ” McDonnell v. United States, 579 U.S. 550, 569 (2016) (quoting Jarecki v. G. D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961)). See, e.g., Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 573–575 (1995) (employing the canon to interpret “communication” in the statutory list “ ‘prospectus, notice, circular, advertisement, letter, or communication’ ”). The ejusdem canon applies when “a catchall phrase” follows “an enumeration of specifics, as in dogs, cats, horses, cattle, and other animals.” Scalia & Garner §32, at 199. We often interpret the catchall phrase to “embrace only objects similar in nature to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words.” Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 115 (2001). See, e.g., Washington State Dept. of Social and Health Servs. v. Guardianship Estate of Keffeler, 537 U.S. 371, 375, 385 (2003) (employing the canon to construe the general term in the statutory list “ ‘execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or other legal process’ ”).

These canons are valuable tools. But applying either to (c)(2) is like using a hammer to pound in a screw—it looks like it might work, but using it botches the job.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5547413&forum_id=2#47790630)