are his law clerks not good enough

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48682248)

he's not hiring outside counsel. he's essentially appointing an amicus

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48682402)

but the USDC refused in the case of General Flynn and this USDC is refusing too.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48682341)

Sorry Sir we cannot dismiss sir right now sir but we have Hansome Paul looking into it sir, thank you sir!

Ho was born in 1977 in San Jose, California to immigrants to the United States from the Philippines.[3][2] He received his Bachelor of Arts in political philosophy, summa cum laude, from Princeton University in 1999 with membership in Phi Beta Kappa. He then received his Juris Doctor from Yale Law School in 2005.[2][4]

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48682296)

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dale_Ho

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48682310)

but it's just not clear what viewpoint Clement is supposed to espouse. in the normal case of an appointment the lawyer is supposed to argue on behalf of a holding expressed below. here?

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48684563)

If the latter, can the judge appoint a special prosecutor to prosecute the case?

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48682616)

Josh Blackman with some rando thoughts about it.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48684541)

a similar (but different) thing happened with General Flynn.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48731211)

ARGUMENT . 12

I. Separation-Of-Powers Principles, Which Exist Primarily To Promote

Individual Liberty, Inform The Courts' Role In ReviewingMotions Under Rule

48(a)...... 12

II. Rule 48(a) Vests Courts With A Limited, But Essential, Power To Vindicate

LibertyByAvoiding Even The Appearance OfExecutive Overreach . 16

CONCLUSION.......... 25

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48731370)

Since their adoption in the 1940s, the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure have

consistently provided (with minor changes in wording) that “ [t]he government may, with leave of

court, dismiss an indictment.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 48(a) (emphasis added). Rule 48(a) deliberately

departed from prior practice by reserving a judicial role when the executive seeks to unwind

criminal process that has proceeded past the grand jury phase. The Rule does not allow the

executive to dismiss a prosecution unilaterally or dictate that a dismissal be without prejudice. But

Rule 48(a) does not- -and could not?fundamentally transform the dynamic among the branches.

Nothing in the Rule expressly authorizes the Article III branch to force the Article II branch to

continue a prosecution against its will, or to appoint a private party to take it over. Moreover, like

the constitutional separation ofpowers itself, the principal office ofRule 48(a) is the protection of

individual liberty. It protects the speedy-trial rights and other liberty interests ofthe defendant.

Consistent with these principles, Rule 48(a) provides the court with an important, but limited, role

in assessingthe government's motion to discontinue an ongoing prosecution. The Rule authorizes

the court to consider how the prosecution should be discontinued with or without prejudice?

ratherthan empowering the court to take over the distinctly executive prosecutorial function.

The same basic separation-of-powers principles that counsel against a court maintaining a

prosecution overthe executive's objection support dismissal with prejudice here. The executive's

unilateral option for ending a prosecution—namely, a pardon—more closely resembles a dismissal

with prejudice. And the executive's undoubted power to decline to initiate a prosecution leaves a

citizen's liberty untouched. But a dismissal without prejudice creates a palpable sense that the

prosecution outlined in the indictment and approved by a grand jury could be renewed, a prospect

that hangs like the proverbial Sword of Damocles over the accused. Such an ongoing prospect of

re-indictment is particularly problematic when it comes to the sensitive task of prosecuting public

officials. There is an inherent risk that once an indictment has been procured, the prospect ofreindictment could create the appearance, if not the reality, that the actions of a public official are

being driven by concerns about staying in the good graces ofthe federal executive, rather than the

best interests of his constituents. That prospect explains the absence of deferred prosecution

agreements involving public officials. Dismissal with prejudice avoids those concerns and

promotes another important separation-of-powers virtue— namely, accountability.

These general principles inform the specific questions the Court has asked the parties and

amicus to address. In short, Rule 48(a) gives the court an important, but limited, role, principally

focused on how not whether—a prosecution should be dismissed. In discharging that function,

a court can consider materials outside the Rule 48(a) motion itself, but should conduct that inquiry

with sensitivity to separation-of-powers principles and avoid unnecessary intrusion into the

prosecutorial function. In a rare case like this, where executive deliberations have already been

made public, the Court need not ignore those materials. Moreover, the proper scope ofjudicial

inquiry is informed by the primary judicial mission under Rule 48(a)—namely, deciding whether

to dismissthe prosecution with or without prejudice. Thus, where the publicly availablematerials

are sufficient to support dismissal with prejudice, there is no need for further inquiry. Here, the

publicly available materials—and the basic dynamic of a federal prosecution ofa popularly elected

public official—counsel in favor of dismissal with prejudice. Finally, even ifthis Court were to

deny the government's motion, it could not constitutionally force the executive to proceed, which

would likely necessitate a dismissal with prejudice on speedy-trial grounds.

In short, Rule 48(a) gives this Court a vital , but limited, role in determining whether

dismissal should be with or without dismissal. And all roads here— including the same separationof-powers principles that constrain the Court's options—lead to dismissal with prejudice.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5684008&forum_id=2#48731376)