This was extremely painful to read, in addition to being utterly retarded and thoroughly unconvincing

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48189317)

GOP is now projected to end Pennsylvania VBM requests at 58D/30.5R. D+27, vs D+48 in 2022

This will likely get *more R* as we move forward.

Dems are heading into what I'd broadly consider catastrophe here. 1.1M requests vs GOP ending at 570k requests now.

This is a mammoth change in the GOP and the GOP *can afford this change* as they now are tied with Dems in active voters with a much stronger history of turnout

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48188069)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48188077)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48188111)

https://www.nj.com/politics/2024/10/trump-vs-harris-who-appears-to-be-winning-early-vote-in-pennsylvania.html?outputType=amp

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48188113)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48188139)

This dynamic, where the GOP improves early turnout but fails to dominate swing groups, is not unlike the Democrats’ 2004 mobilization efforts, which achieved significant turnout gains but fell short in key demographics like Evangelicals. The current trend signals a structural fragility in Trump’s electoral college safety net. The demographic shifts—independents moving leftward and a spike in women voters—could unravel this advantage in critical states like Georgia and North Carolina, much as Kerry's reliance on Midwest blue-collar voters collapsed under Bush’s broader suburban appeal.

The danger for Trump now lies in underestimating the significance of these broader shifts. If the same pattern holds, it’s like watching the unraveling of the Bush 2000-2004 advantage in reverse, where Democrats increasingly dominated through both registration and turnout, leaving Republicans clutching at dwindling margins. As a 6'2" election expert, it's evident this dynamic could flip the expected outcomes, turning even supposedly ‘safe’ GOP strongholds into competitive battlegrounds, reducing Trump's electoral advantage to a precarious position in every swing state. Interestingly, Republicans are indeed outperforming their early vote efforts from 2020, a reflection of strategic adjustments in mobilization akin to the French parliamentary elections in 1951, when the Gaullists pivoted from over-reliance on post-war political structures to a more dynamic approach in the face of socialist gains. Here, we see the GOP taking an aggressive stance in early voting—previously a domain dominated by Democrats—by reshaping the expectations of its base. This shift echoes Nixon’s efforts in the 1968 election, where his campaign not only adapted to the newfound power of television but also reshaped Republican turnout mechanisms in response to shifting suburban demographics.

Yet, as in 1951, when the French left outmaneuvered early conservative advances by securing key urban centers, Democrats in 2024 are capitalizing on the female vote and independents, broadening their coalition in a way that feels both inevitable and unforeseen. Trump’s gains in early voting, while impressive compared to his 2020 showing, may ultimately be insufficient if the broader coalition dynamics continue to shift in favor of Democrats. The GOP risks repeating the Conservative Party’s fate in the 1974 UK general election, where initial polling advantages and early turnout gave way to unexpected losses once the Labor Party harnessed economic concerns and an energized base.

In essence, the Republicans have improved their early turnout performance, much like parties in the past that adjusted their strategies after defeat. However, the demographic realignments—particularly among women and unaffiliated voters—present a looming challenge, one that could undo these early gains. It's the familiar story of small tactical victories within a broader strategic defeat, as was the case with the Weimar Republic’s electoral maneuvers in the late 1920s, where gains in parliamentary representation failed to offset the rise of the opposition.

To conclude, what we are witnessing is a classic case of Settled Political Science: when one party, such as the Republicans, improves upon past performance, it is not sufficient to shift the balance if the opposition has outmaneuvered them on demographic fronts. The GOP's increased early voting turnout resembles the Unionist Party's efforts in the 1906 British election, where initial gains masked a tectonic shift in voter alignment that resulted in catastrophic losses once the larger forces of opposition coalesced.

The outcome in each swing state is therefore largely predictable, despite surface-level improvements for Trump’s base. In Georgia, where demographic diversification parallels that of post-war German politics under Konrad Adenauer, the Democratic grip remains strong, powered by surging women voters and independents. North Carolina, increasingly resembling the political volatility of 19th-century Belgium, will likely swing Democratic as well, despite the GOP’s efforts to consolidate rural areas. Pennsylvania and Michigan, with their deep-rooted industrial pasts, recall the oscillations of early Third Republic France, yet here too, the GOP finds itself facing a fundamentally altered electorate that has tilted left.

In Arizona, where demographic shifts echo the political transformation of Spain’s autonomous regions in the late 20th century, Democrats are poised to prevail, buoyed by the very suburban voters the GOP once counted on. Florida, more reminiscent of the Byzantine Empire’s perpetual contest for dominance between competing forces, remains precariously Republican, but the margin will be slim and illusory. The GOP’s supposed safety net in Texas, much like the latter stages of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, appears increasingly brittle—only the sheer weight of history keeps it from tipping fully Democratic.

Thus, the mosaic of swing states will unfold predictably: the Democrats will triumph in Georgia, North Carolina, Arizona, Pennsylvania, Michigan, and Wisconsin. Florida remains a tenuous GOP hold, while Texas teeters on the edge of competitive purgatory. All these outcomes affirm what has been known: this matter is settled. Trump’s electoral college advantage from prior cycles has been diminished to the point of irrelevance, leaving him as the underdog across the board.

As a 6'2" election expert, it is clear that despite tactical improvements, the strategic landscape has irreversibly shifted. Like the fall of empires past, these early successes are but the last flickers of an outdated political order, destined to be overtaken by a rising tide of demographic realignment.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48189587)

Date: October 11th, 2024 1:29 PM

Author: .....;;,,.........;.;.;.;.,;,;,;.;.;,;

Over a third of GOP early vote so far was Election Day vote in 2020 v 11% for Dems, and the Dems are cleaning up with unaffiliateds, and there is a spike in women voters across the board. So Trump campaign strategy to drive more early voting seems to be working, but Dems are outpacing it by adding more women and dominating the independent vote. This is a surprising result in the context of all the Trump campaign strategy that’s been discussed in the press, but also a reasonably foreseeable result of a process where one side has vastly more turnout resources applied than the other side does. This would be even more fatal in GA and NC if the same pattern held, and it would strongly suggest that the electoral college bias for Trump over the last two cycles is in danger of being shrunk to the point that he’s a significant underdog in every swing state and the current swing state polls are all overstating his support by a few points. Trumpmos, you should be more worried about this.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2#48187445)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48189739)

So is this a straight poa, a big Willie, a double reverse big Willie, or something else?

Thread locked due to retarded people on BOTH SIDES. Both sides, ok?

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48189782)

There’s no way to tell which way independents/NPAs will go, and even minor shifts in crossover vote (registered Ds voting R and vice versa) have major consequences.

What EV data can tell you is whether an election will be close or a landslide. If Dems had the same number of absentee votes in PA now as 2020 while GOP declines by half, then you’d expect a massive win for Kamala. Right now the EV data indicate the election will be close, which is consistent with almost all of the polls.

The one metric that I think is most useful is black percent vs. previous cycles, in states with race data such as NC. (You can also look at turnout in black counties). Blacks consistently vote 90% Dem so if black turnout is down relative to the past cycle, Dems have a problem. But they can overcome it with a small gain with whites.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48189865)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5610088&forum_id=2...id#48190742)