First, helium is not globally fungible in the same way hydrocarbons are. It is a byproduct of natural gas extraction, and only certain gas fields have economically recoverable helium concentrations. That already creates a highly uneven production topology.

Second, the “33% through the Strait of Hormuz” framing likely conflates helium with LNG or broader natural gas flows. Helium itself is not shipped in bulk via standard tanker routes through that chokepoint. Instead, it is:

• extracted at a small number of facilities,

• purified and liquefied,

• transported in specialized cryogenic containers (often ISO containers),

• and routed through a much more fragmented logistics network.

The actual concentration risk is upstream, not maritime.

The real bottlenecks look more like this:

• A handful of production nodes: historically dominated by the United States (notably the Federal Helium Reserve), with major contributions now from Qatar, Algeria, and more recently Russia and Tanzania (developing).

• Processing infrastructure: helium requires extremely low temperatures (≈4 K), so liquefaction capacity is capital-intensive and not easily replicated.

• Storage fragility: helium escapes—literally. It diffuses, cannot be easily stockpiled long-term without loss, and once vented is effectively gone from the system.

• Demand rigidity in critical sectors: MRI machines, semiconductor fabrication, aerospace, cryogenics research—these are not easily substitutable in the short term.

So the risk profile is less “single chokepoint catastrophe” and more “highly concentrated, low-redundancy production system with brittle scaling.”

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5849904&forum_id=2\u0026mark_id=5310684#49774812)