Russia’s summer offensive is winding down. Many in the West focus on the grinding progress its troops have made, and the shortage of Ukrainian manpower it has exposed. But that is to look down the telescope from the wrong end. More striking is how little territory Russia has taken in its third and largest offensive; and the terrible cost it has paid in men and materiel. Unless something dramatic changes, Vladimir Putin will be unable to win the war on the battlefield. The fact that he nevertheless continues to try regardless suggests that he is out of ideas.

Exactly how poorly Russian forces have fared is impossible to tell. But data from satellites and shifts in areas of control suggest when the fighting is intensifying, and that permits a rough guess. This lines up well with more than 200 credible estimates of casualties from Western governments and independent researchers. Combining these data allows The Economist to estimate Russian losses and track them over time.

Our meta-estimate suggests that, from the beginning of the full-scale invasion to January of this year, Russian casualties amounted to 640,000–877,000 soldiers, of whom 137,000–228,000 have died. By October 13th, those totals had risen by almost 60%, to 984,000–1,438,000 casualties, including 190,000–480,000 dead.

Russia’s losses have not won a commensurate gain in territory. Since the battle lines stabilised after Ukraine’s first counteroffensive ended in October 2022, they have barely moved. No large city has changed hands. At the pace of the past 30 days, seizing what remains of the four regions Mr Putin already claims—Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhia—would take until June 2030. (For Russia to occupy all of Ukraine would require a further 103 years.)

Moreover, a sudden collapse in Ukraine’s defensive lines is unlikely given how the two armies are fighting the war. Constant drone surveillance, coupled with long-range precision weaponry, has made massing forces near the front suicidal. Incremental gains remain possible—though only at enormous cost—by sending small groups of men into the “kill zone” to stake out forward positions. It is hard to breach Ukrainian lines. Should a breach happen, the advance of massed forces and equipment needed to exploit it is extremely difficult.

Perhaps that is why this summer’s fighting appears to have been much less deadly for Ukraine than for Russia. There is too little data for us to generate a meta-estimate of the cost to Ukraine. However, UALosses, a website, has catalogued 77,403 deaths among Ukrainian soldiers since the full-scale invasion began (it reckons a further 77,842 are missing in action). By date of death, there has been a marked downward trend since last autumn, with 8,668 fatalities recorded this year. Crucially, that is a lower bound, and although independent investigations have confirmed the fate of soldiers in the list, no one knows how many are missing from that count. Moreover, recent deaths are less likely to be in the database, as recording them takes time (some will never be included). But even if the true number is twice the tally, the figures would imply a ratio this year of roughly five Russian soldiers killed for every Ukrainian.

At such rates, manpower may soon become a more serious constraint for Russia than for Ukraine. When the offensive began, Russians were lured with generous sign-on bonuses, and Mr Putin’s recruitment drive outpaced Ukraine’s by 10,000-15,000 per month. But Russia’s heavy casualties this summer probably nullified that advantage.

https://www.economist.com/interactive/europe/2025/10/17/russia-latest-big-ukraine-offensive-gains-next-to-nothing-again

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5787431&forum_id=2\u0026show=posted#49357428)

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5787431&forum_id=2\u0026show=posted#49357435)

Bottom line: war has always favored the defender, but that's far more true in the drone age.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5787431&forum_id=2\u0026show=posted#49357470)

Also since most of the OSINT people and intelligence sources looking at this conflict that are talking about it are sympathetic to Ukraine it doesn't feel like there are the same incentives for third party analysts to be digging too deep into UA casualty figures.

I'm not saying the reality is some sort of AREReptile crap, trust me.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5787431&forum_id=2\u0026show=posted#49357477)

What use are they in the age of cheap drones and smart missiles?

Seems like that's almost even true on land now? Good luck getting past an enemy with long range weapons and drones watching your every move.

(http://www.autoadmit.com/thread.php?thread_id=5787431&forum_id=2\u0026show=posted#49357532)